Per-agent file ownership with Unix permission enforcement:
- Agent directories owned by agent ID (UID), group 'agent' (GID)
- Private files (plan, ctl, fifo): mode 0600 - owner only
- Group-readable (chat, log): mode 0440 - owner + agent group
- World-readable (state, id): mode 0444 - observable by all
- Prompt: mode 0220 - CLI and owner can write
virtfs: fix UID/GID inheritance through nested paths
- Added findChildWithInheritance() to accumulate inherited UID/GID
- Stat now correctly shows agent ID as owner for nested files
server: admin bypass for server owner
- serverAdmin variable captures the Unix user running olliesrv
- Admin bypass includes empty uname, 'admin', or server owner
Documentation updates:
- fs/doc.go: 'The Namespace IS the Security Model'
- registry/doc.go: capability-based tool access
- peer.go: capability-based peer access
- lessons-learned.md: 'Model compliance is not a security boundary'
- architecture-9p.md: per-agent file ownership section
Security evaluation:
- Added experiments/security-eval/ with NERV attack corpus adaptation
- Test scripts for Landlock sandbox validation
- RESULTS.md documenting 0% ASR on hostile operations
This implements the NERV thesis: 'An agent can only access resources
explicitly bound into its namespace.' Enforcement is structural via
file permissions, not behavioral via model compliance.
The event stream with filtering replaces statewait:
- echo filter | rdwrs event
Removed:
- statewait file from agent namespace
- All non-historical references in docs and code
The state file remains for simple polling reads.
Levi Neely