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docs: fix auth section - both servers use attach identity for permissions

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Levi Neely 2026-08-12 18:20:34 +02:00
parent 255986bad6
commit 92d9fec51a
1 changed files with 18 additions and 13 deletions
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doc/9p.md
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@ -248,20 +248,25 @@ output here
---
## Authentication
## Authentication and permissions
olliesrv does not require authentication — any client that can reach the Unix
socket (or TCP port) can connect.
Both servers use the identity provided at attach time for permission enforcement.
toolsrv requires Tauth. The protocol:
**olliesrv** does not require Tauth (no secret exchange), but the `uname` from
Tattach is used for standard 9P file permission checks (uid/gid/world bits).
Files are owned by the server's user with group `agent`; any attaching client
is added to the `agent` group, so group permission bits govern what agents can
access.
1. Client sends Tauth with a shared secret as the write payload and `aname`
identifying the agent.
2. Server verifies the secret (first client sets it; subsequent clients must match).
3. Server returns a session token via read on the auth fid.
4. Client attaches using the authenticated afid.
**toolsrv** requires Tauth. The protocol:
The `aname` field is used for permission enforcement — it scopes tool registry
lookups and process ownership to the connecting agent. Currently there is no
mechanism to prevent one agent from claiming another's identity; the scheme
relies on all clients being spawned by olliesrv with the correct secret.
1. Client sends Tauth with `aname` identifying the agent.
2. Client writes the shared secret to the auth fid.
3. Server verifies the secret (first client sets it; subsequent clients must match).
4. Server returns a session token via read on the auth fid.
5. Client attaches using the authenticated afid.
The `aname` field scopes tool registry lookups and process ownership to the
connecting agent. Currently there is no mechanism to prevent one agent from
claiming another's identity; the scheme relies on all clients being spawned by
olliesrv with the correct secret.